As we approach an election,it seems the possibility of five more years of “Broon’s” lacklustre government hangs over us like a spectre. Apart from his destruction of Great Britain as a cohesive unit, he has overseen the deaths of far too many of our brave troops, both in Iraq and latterly in Afghanistan. How much more blood can this modern day “Pontias Pilate” spill and still expect to “wash his hands”? I am an ardent supporter of our armed forces, yet they are truly “Lions led by Donkeys” or in this case “Donkey”. We have been in the Afghan conflict, propping up a corrupt government run by Mohammed Karzei, with no apparent clear aims or goals. A good friend sent me the following article by “Colonel Richard Kemp” which you need to read. Then ask yourself why? and For what? have the sons and daughters of this green and pleasant land been sacrificed on Blair and Browns altar. These two men have the blood of our troops on their hands, was it to promote democracy, halt the drugs trade, or empower women? Or was it just to boost their ego’s as “war leaders” and take the public spotlight from the disastrous way in which they were abandoning our economy and sovereignty, to the banks and the EU. Read the article and think about it when voting time comes:
DEFENCE25/03/2010
‘In war, there are principles, but they are few’. The words of Napoleon’s Marshal T-R Bugeaud de Piconnerie remain valid today, and the single most important principle is leadership. Leadership at the point of battle, where we are fortunate to have superb commanders like Captain David Hicks, mortally wounded and drenched in his own blood, demanding to be carried back to his command post to lead his company in the teeth of a devastating Taliban assault. Leadership also in Whitehall, command post of Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who sent Captain Hicks and his men into battle, and who is responsible for the direction of the British war in Afghanistan. Gordon Brown recognised David Hicks’s leadership qualities, nominating him ‘person of the year’. But how does the Prime Minister’s own leadership measure up?
After the defeat of France in 1940, Churchill galvanised the British people to stand defiant against the Nazi menace and within two and a half years of taking office had succeeded in driving from Egypt a German army that had until then known only victory. In the same time-frame, since Gordon Brown became Prime Minister, British public support for the war in Afghanistan has plummeted, the Taliban has expanded its capability, power and influence in Britain’s area of responsibility, and the Afghan government has descended to new depths of corruption.
Plainly this amounts to a failure in leadership, but has the failure been the Prime Minister’s alone? War is a difficult and complex business. Modern-day politicians have no personal military experience and therefore no practical understanding of war. Most MPs enter politics to improve the nation’s education, health, social security and economic wellbeing. Few have much interest in defence. Senior Labour politicians, in particular, lack empathy: in many cases, their backgrounds in CND and other utopian groups opposed to the very concept of military power, suggest a distinct, natural antipathy.
Even more than in the past, this reality makes senior military officers’ advice and influence essential. But there is little evidence it has been as effective as it should have been. Senior officers too face challenges, of course. How easy is it to influence the current political leadership? And for most, the type of wars we have been fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan are beyond their experience, grounded as it is in preparing to repel the Soviet hordes in Europe by land, sea and air; or at best, supporting the police in Northern Ireland. To make matters worse, it must surely be a British first to go through a land war with no direct advice to the Prime Minister from an Army chief.
One of the most important attributes of a war leader is to identify the war aim and communicate it clearly to the armed forces and the population. In the Afghanistan campaign such clarity has been glaringly absent since the Defence Secretary’s 2006 declaration that ‘we would be perfectly happy to leave in three years and without firing one shot’. According to him we were entering Helmand ‘to help the Afghan people construct their own democracy’, ‘not counter-terrorism’. Since then we have had ‘eradicating the narcotics trade’, ‘educating girls’, ‘supporting reconstruction’, and ‘extending human rights’. Four years, seven million bullets and nearly 300 dead soldiers later, no-one in the Ministry of Defence or Foreign Office is allowed to call the conflict in Afghanistan a war.
History shows that Prime Ministers and Presidents succeed in time of war or national crisis only when personally engaged and fully committed. The Prime Minister’s attitude to the Iraq war may provide some insight into his commitment to the Afghan campaign. In his evidence to the Chilcot Inquiry he tried to distance himself from the major decision-making and planning processes. This was starkly illustrated by his astonishing admission that, as the second most senior member of the cabinet that was committing this country to war, he didn’t see the early advice given to the Prime Minister by the Attorney General expressing concerns about the legality of that war.
The lack of political commitment to war in Afghanistan has been demonstrated most clearly by the glaringly inadequate provision of forces to Helmand since the day we deployed there. Our forces have fought with courage and skill, defeating the Taliban in every engagement. But they have been badly under-resourced, and there have been inadequate numbers to bring proper security to areas they have cleared of the enemy.
Despite its widely-recognised importance for winning over the people in counter-insurgency, resourcing for reconstruction and development in Helmand too has been pitifully inadequate. Gordon Brown told the Chilcot Inquiry that he regretted not pushing harder on post-occupation planning for the Iraq war. He has repeated the error in Afghanistan, neither providing adequate resources himself nor successfully pressing the Americans or anyone else to do so.
All of this has been matched by a failure to bring effective political and diplomatic pressure to bear on President Karzai. Despite the influence that spilt British blood should bring, the Afghan government has been allowed to forfeit the confidence of the people through corruption and nepotism. Damaging at any time, this is hugely dangerous in the face of a violent insurgency.
Lack of commitment in theatre has been compounded by inadequate leadership across government at home. The rivalries, compromises and shifting sands of internal party politics make government unity tougher than in time of all-out war. But no matter how difficult, every element of the government involved in the prosecution of this war needs to be coordinated from the centre, through a war cabinet. Industry should be energised, where necessary commissioned to work round the clock to provide vital equipment for our fighting troops.
Any effective war leader must believe in victory. Instead of communicating such a vision, we have heard mainly pusillanimous suggestions such as ‘this is not about winning or losing’. Well, yes it is. It’s about us winning and the Taliban losing. And if it isn’t, then our troops should not be fighting and dying. We must break the insurgency through a combination of means, including the destruction of insurgent forces and splitting away those who can be persuaded to cease violent opposition to the Afghan government. Not only must the insurgents and the local population know that this is our unwavering and achievable war aim, but so must our own people. Instead our population has been subjected to bewilderingly mixed messages about our objectives.
Rarely a week goes by without news of soldiers being killed in Afghanistan. But we are never told of damage done to the Taliban, and hardly ever of other successes bought by British blood. What would have been the effect on the morale of the people of this country if in 1940 they were told only of Spitfire losses and never of how many Messerschmitts had been shot down?
In the face of an absence of clarity about our war aims, an apparent lack of commitment to the campaign by the government and a seeming indifference to victory, made worse by refusal to publicise our successes, it is hardly surprising that there is a falling-away of support among our own population. This must not continue: we are more likely to lose the war at home than on the battlefield.
To some extent the US Cavalry have stormed to the rescue in Helmand. But this is still very much our fight, and in many respects, still ours to lose. We must fight and win in Afghanistan to protect our people at home and abroad. 2010 and 2011 will be pivotal years in this campaign. Our forces, fighting 4,000 miles from home, need proper, committed and unambiguous political leadership, and our people here also need to be led – by the Prime Minister – not just to get behind the troops but, critically, to support what they are trying to achieve in this war.
Col. Richard Kemp is a former commander of British forces in Afghanistan, and the author of Attack State Red.
Original article here:
http://critical-reaction.co.uk/articles/we_have_to_be_in_it_to_win_it
